As is well known, Husserl develops phenomenology as a method for both describing and assessing the scientific praxis (Wiltsche 2020; Feist 2004). Husserl develops his account of the theory of science throughout his immense work, from the Logical Investigations to the 1905-‘08 lectures on perception, from Ideas II-III to the Krisis, and from C-manuscripts to Hua XXXVIII. In particular, in this contribution I intend to reassess the Husserlian foundation of physics. As a matter of fact, since the debate between Schlick and Cassirer about the logical formalization of Einstein’s theory of general relativity, the contemporary philosophy of science developed from neo-empiricism to different varieties of naturalism, substantially ignoring the role of transcendental subject in epistemology. Nevertheless, Weyl’s contribution to the debate on the problem of continuity (1918) and London’s introduction (1983) of the observer’s consciousness in quantum mechanics (in opposition to Schrödinger) clearly demonstrate the fruitfulness of phenomenology for the foundation of physics.
Under these premises, my contribution intends to show the relevance of the transcendental subjectivity for the description of general relativity and quantum mechanics. Furthermore, I will sketch some lines of a phenomenological interpretation of Quantum-Gravity, nowadays the most popular theory of reunification of general relativity and quantum mechanics.