Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

Conference | Paper

Phenomenology of human being and metaphysical assumptions of science in Vasily Sesemann's philosophy

Dalius Jonkus

Tuesday 13 September 2022

14:00 - 14:45

Palazzo del Capitanio-Aula AIS 2

Vasily Sesemann's (1884-1963) philosophy transformed from epistemology to philosophical anthropology. Sesemann argued that a distinction should be made between objectifying and non-objectifying attitudes. The object-oriented approach is entrenched in the natural sciences and is also applied to the knowledge of the human existence. However, Sesemann criticizes objectivism and argues that this approach limits not only the understanding of human being but also of the whole of living nature. According to the philosopher, positivism adheres to an objective attitude and therefore presents a naturalistic conception of human consciousness. This philosophy is attached to the natural scientific methodology and ignores the specifics of the humanities. Positivism denies the metaphysical assumptions of science and reduces life to matter. Sesemann argued that any knowledge is related to attitudes and therefore philosophers must reflect on these attitudes of knowledge. In other words, all knowledge, even scientific, takes a position and formulates their viewpoint based on some point of view. According to Sesemann, knowledge without metaphysical and value assumptions is impossible. Criticism of positivism reveals that by knowing human being as an object we simplify human existence. As an alternative, Sesemann refers to phenomenological-existential philosophy, which understands human being as a subject, and restores the classical worldview function to philosophy. In this report, based on Sesemann's 'metaphysical-anthropological' manuscripts I will first examine the significance of the objectivistic and personalistic approach to human existence, then discuss the critique of the positivist conception of science, and finally analyze the phenomenological-existential philosophy as an alternative.