Cultural tradition can be understood positively or negatively. The ambivalence of tradition can be described by two questions: Why does transmissibility exist, and why does each generation of people not have to start all over again, but can adopt and pass on habits, customs, skills and knowledge to others? How does tradition turn into the schematization of embodied memory and the inertia of habits? Preservation of the past in the present can only happen with the appearance of certain traces, materialized references, or embodied schemes. In geology, chemistry, and oceanology, there is a term of sedimentation, which describes the existence of the past in the present. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty studied the sedimentations of experience in order to reveal the assumptions, genesis and development of the historicity of embodied consciousness. Derrida used the phenomenological concept of sedimentation and created "Gramatology" because he sought to combine a dynamic genesis with stable structures. Ferraris applied these ideas of Derrida while developing the theory of documentality. The main idea of documentality is that a particular kind of social objects, namely documents (records of social acts) are the basis of social reality. For all three philosophers, writing or recording becomes a model for reflecting on cultural tradition. The documentality theory formulated by Ferraris and the case of the mobile phone as a social object reminds us of the importance of writing/recording in the social and cultural world. Ideas and social commitments acquire cultural significance and value only when they are recorded in writing. Derrida and Ferraris rightly point out the importance of writing as the objectification and communication of a meaning. Ideal objects and social objects require materially sensory objectification, but writing is neither an all-saving memory nor forgetfullness. Writing must be read not only by understanding the letters or ideograms, but also by understanding what they mean. Husserl understood writing as a sedimentation that must be reactivated. However, Derrida and Ferraris identify the written objects only with materialized writing and the repetition of what is written. The analysis of sedimented forms of memory leads to the question of whether it is possible to return to the primal sources of meaning. Are there such records, habits, customs that can function in the present, even if their primal meaning is lost? I argue that the cultural tradition of ideal objects as free idealities is possible only on the basis of reactivation, which is not imitative repetition but a return to primal intuitions.