In this paper I present a comparative analysis of later Merleau-Ponty’s conception of history as “logic within contingence” and Hannah Arendt’s unexplored thesis that historical reality is “caused contingently”. My aim is, mainly, to show that there is in both thinkers an attempt to reconcile contingency and necessity in history and, secondly, to bring out disparities pointing to different interpretations of Being. Merleau-Ponty’s abandonment of reductionist Marxism leads him to develop an approach to history, which interweaves the necessary with the fortuitous. In the Lectures at the Collège de France, he introduces the concept of institution. History is conceived as a milieu of life, an interrelation between underlying causality and human freedom. I show how the interdependence of instituting activity and instituted state allows for a certain amount of free play within the historical vectors, leading Merleau-Ponty to define historical novelty as “a transformation that preserves [but also] surpasses”.
Concerning Arendt, I focus on her examination of Scotus’ devotion to “save freedom” by paying “the price of contingency”. My intention is to demonstrate its importance for Arendt’s understanding of history. I suggest an interpretation that allows for the detection of a theory of contingent causation, about which Arendt is not entirely explicit. According to Arendt, freedom as pure inauguration appears through action and “history is… the outcome of action”. Thus, by highlighting her construal of human action as the causative element in human affairs, which condemns them to contingency, I claim that her approach strikes a balance between contingency and necessity in history.
Despite Merleau-Ponty’s and Arendt’s common intentions, there remain some important discrepancies. Unlike Arendt, Merleau-Ponty’s perspective does not allow for the emergence of the radically new. I argue that this divergence points to a deeper ontological level. By looking their respective conceptions of Being, I spot subtle differences between the Merleaupontyan “flesh” and the Arendtian “in-between”, which justify their conflicting views on historical novelty.