It is commonplace to distinguish three ideals of scientific objectivity, namely 1) faithfulness to facts, 2) value-freedom and 3) freedom from personal biases (see Reiss & Sprenger 2020). In this paper, I argue that Husserl’s analyses of objective sciences in Krisis offer a critical appraisal of all three conceptions. First, Husserl’s criticism of the positivistic idea of science and its restricted sense of objectivity can be leveled against the first two notions: if only truths about the factual world are accepted as objectively valid and if all evaluative position-takings are precluded, then normative, cultural and existential questions are largely excluded from objective sciences (Hua VI, §§2–3). Second, Husserl’s principle of presuppositionlessness (or freedom from prejudice) and his method of universal epoché can be read as a radical version of the third ideal of objectivity. Besides averting subjective biases of individual researchers and disclosing collective biases of scientific communities, Husserl’s methodology seeks to bracket or withhold ontological commitments globally. Husserl believes this allows for understanding objective sciences as intersubjectively constituted and enables critical clarification of the goals, norms and interests guiding scientific practice, including the ideals of objectivity (§35, §55). I argue that Husserl thus develops methodological tools for examining different ideals of objectivity and values in science in general in a self-critical manner.