Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

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235549

A truthmaker indispensability argument

Sam Baron

pp. 2413-2427

Abstract

Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of the indispensability argument.

Publication details

Published in:

(2013) Synthese 190 (12).

Pages: 2413-2427

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9989-2

Full citation:

Baron Sam (2013) „A truthmaker indispensability argument“. Synthese 190 (12), 2413–2427.