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Synthese

Doxastic agency and epistemic responsibility

Volume 194 (8)

edited byAndrea KruseHeinrich Wansing

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Introduction to the special issue "doxastic agency and epistemic responsibility" Andrea KruseHeinrich Wansing

pp.2667-2671

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1153-6
Believing intentionally Matthias Steup

pp.2673-2694

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0780-7
Negative doxastic voluntarism and the concept of belief Hans Rott

pp.2695-2720

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1032-1
Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism Nikolaj Nottelmann

pp.2721-2744

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0768-3
Attitudinal control Conor McHugh

pp.2745-2762

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0643-7
Agency of belief and intention A. K. Flowerree

pp.2763-2784

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1138-5
On the analogy of free will and free belief Verena Wagner

pp.2785-2810

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0851-9
Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control Andrea Kruse

pp.2811-2842

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0951-6
Remarks on the logic of imagination

a step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination

Heinrich Wansing

pp.2843-2861

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0945-4
Should have known Sanford C. Goldberg

pp.2863-2894

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0662-z
Responsible belief and epistemic justification Rik Peels

pp.2895-2915

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1038-8
A hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance Stephan Krämer

pp.2917-2930

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1078-0
Wigner's puzzle and the pythagorean heuristic Jane McDonnell

pp.2931-2948

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1080-6
Inscrutability and visual objects Ben Phillips

pp.2949-2971

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1083-3
Virtuous distinctions Will Fleisher

pp.2973-3003

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1084-2
Why broad content can't influence behaviour Cressida Gaukroger

pp.3005-3020

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1085-1
A Russellian account of suspended judgment Philip Atkins

pp.3021-3046

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1089-x
Time, change and time without change Ken Warmbrod

pp.3047-3067

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1090-4
Two new objections to explanationism Bryan C. AppleyGregory Stoutenburg

pp.3069-3084

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1093-1
Rejecting Pereboom's empirical objection to agent-causation Jordan Baker

pp.3085-3100

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1094-0

Publication details

Journal: Synthese

Volume: 194

Issue: 8

Year: 2017

Full citation:

Kruse Andrea, Wansing Heinrich (2017) Doxastic agency and epistemic responsibility. Synthese 194 (8).