This paper focuses on the possibility of transcendental constitution of the life-world: is it possible to constitute the life-world, and does the concept of life-world modify something essential in the concept of transcendental constitution? There were in fact interpretations of Husserlian thought which admitted that in the last period Husserl gave up the method of transcendental constitution and defended the thesis that the world as totality is unconstituable. In this paper we try to demonstrate that Husserl never gave up transcendental constitution, and to clarify structures and specific problems of the constitution of the life-world. Moreover we point to a methodological difficulty: the constitution of the world is identical with the universal and stratified constitution of the strates of objectivity, and is in accordance with the law of foundation of the strates; but there is a fundamental contradiction between that stratified constitution in naturalistic attitude and the real experience of the world in personalistic attitude.