Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

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200755

The illusion of free will and its acceptance

Giuseppe Trautteur

pp. 191-203

Abstract

My central topic will not be whether we are free or not. Rather, I am concerned with the contrast between the feeling of freely choosing and the parallel intellectual experience that the freedom of the will is a delusion. Also of concern are the possible consequences of the general acceptance, or awareness, of this state of affairs.

Publication details

Published in:

Leidlmair Karl (2009) After cognitivism: a reassessment of cognitive science and philosophy. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 191-203

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9992-2_12

Full citation:

Trautteur Giuseppe (2009) The illusion of free will and its acceptance, In: After cognitivism, Dordrecht, Springer, 191–203.