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The illusion of free will and its acceptance
pp. 191-203
Abstract
My central topic will not be whether we are free or not. Rather, I am concerned with the contrast between the feeling of freely choosing and the parallel intellectual experience that the freedom of the will is a delusion. Also of concern are the possible consequences of the general acceptance, or awareness, of this state of affairs.
Publication details
Published in:
Leidlmair Karl (2009) After cognitivism: a reassessment of cognitive science and philosophy. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 191-203
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9992-2_12
Full citation:
Trautteur Giuseppe (2009) The illusion of free will and its acceptance, In: After cognitivism, Dordrecht, Springer, 191–203.