This study does not aspire to classifying the issues traditionally studied by philosophy, problems which are most frequently termed as epistemology, noetics or gnoseology. The term theory of knowledge or theory of cognition does not seem to be very suitable, particularly so as the word "theory" should meet some much stricter requirements. While attempting to solve these problems, we probably cannot bypass some features of the connection between a thorough analysis of cognitive process, modeling of some cognitive procedures (a case in point in these contexts are models of explanatory procedures, predicating proceedings, formulation of generalisations etc.), on the one hand, and global reasoning pertaining to cognition as a whole on the other. The other side of the coin — or perhaps a parasitic by-product of such global reasoning — is an attempt at cramming what is a considerably heterogeneous complex of such activities, whose entirety as well as comprehensive results are called "learning", into the Procrustean bed of an all-encompassing scheme, such as, e.g. the pattern of "reflection", the pattern of simple reductions to elements of empirical activities etc. Attempts at delineating a single, universally conceived source of cognition, in both empirical and rational terms, can be dismissed as equally one-sided.