Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

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185242

Synthesis and imagination

Gary Banham

pp. 96-153

Abstract

The attempts to substantiate a deduction strategy beginning either from the form of judgment or from the transcendental unity of apperception have proven unsuccessful and this has led to a substantiation of our view that it is in fact requisite to articulate a conception of the deduction beginning from a discussion of a priori synthesis. Thus far, the argument to this effect has proceeded by a process of elimination of alternatives but now it is necessary to show that we can illuminate the nature of the Transcendental Deduction in our preferred manner. This will require articulating principally the notion of the transcendental synthesis of imagination. As with our previous chapters we will not proceed here by first setting out a general hermeneutic strategy with regard to the texts of the deduction but rather from a process of reconstruction that will respond to readings of it that have brought to our attention what we take to be particularly pertinent considerations. However, we can state a number of points at the initiation of this reading that will set out parameters that will be important for us in assessing both Kant's own discussions and reconstructions of them.

Publication details

Published in:

Banham Gary (2005) Kant's transcendental imagination. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 96-153

DOI: 10.1057/9780230501195_4

Full citation:

Banham Gary (2005) Synthesis and imagination, In: Kant's transcendental imagination, Dordrecht, Springer, 96–153.