Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

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182877

Dummett's case for intuitionism

Tomasz Placek

pp. 147-193

Abstract

At the time when Heyting was announcing peaceful collaboration between competing schools in the philosophy of mathematics and other intuitionists were adopting a more pragmatic program of formalizing various chapters of intuitionistic mathematics, another reasoning that advocated the necessity of revising classical mathematics in favor of intuitionism was crystallizing in the publications of Michael Dummett. It was not only new and different from those of Brouwer and Heyting, but, as it started with considerations of what a correct account of meaning should be, it marked a significant breach with the already established intuitionistic tradition. Although a part of what Brouwer and Heyting wrote on intuitionism can clearly be viewed as expressions of their views on meaning, their arguments ultimately turn on foundational issues like the nature of infinity or the concept of set rather than on reflections on meaning.

Publication details

Published in:

Placek Tomasz (1999) Mathematical intuitionism and intersubjectivity: a critical exposition of arguments for intuitionism. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 147-193

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9315-1_4

Full citation:

Placek Tomasz (1999) Dummett's case for intuitionism, In: Mathematical intuitionism and intersubjectivity, Dordrecht, Springer, 147–193.