We now turn from memory to proprioception. This chapter and the following one apply the same treatment to proprioception and bodily identity, involving conceptual holism, as that applied to memory and personal identity. The faculty or capacity of proprioception is both familiar — because it underlies the possibility of action — yet mysterious. It yields ordinary knowledge of bodily position and movement — what is loosely termed "bodily awareness". Yet in Philosophy it has until quite recently been neglected; indeed, in my experience the issues it raises remain unfamiliar to general philosophical audiences. Hence a rather fuller account of the nature of proprioception is required than in the case of memory. This chapter aims to demystify proprioception by considering both Phenomenological and Gibsonian accounts. There is important common ground between Gibson's position and that of Phenomenology, both influenced by Gestalt psychology, and a philosophical treatment of the body and self-consciousness should draw on each.