What do “existing” and “having existed” mean? The answer to this question depends radically on the metaphysical assumption that we are making about the nature of time. If we take the present to be privileged over other times, then “having existed” is bound to express a notion close to non-existence. If we think that the present has no ontological supremacy over what was and what will be, then the difference between “having existed” and “existing” is bound to be no deeper than the difference between “existing here” and “existing there”. In this article I show that the view to the effect that the present is privileged, i.e. “presentism”, suffers from a fatal problem concerning the present truth of many past-tensed existential statements. Therefore, we had better abandon it in favour of “eternalism” – the rival view to the effect that between “existing” and “having existed” there is no ontological difference.