Husserl's Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913)¹ contains relatively few statements about the Ego. However, if these statements are taken together and considered within the context of the whole work, the outlines of a fairly large and coherent doctrine appear. In the present interpretation I refer to the Ideen by sections. For the sake of verbal distinctness I adopt Dorion Cairns's translation practices of expressing the concept Husserl usually expressed with the German word Ich with the English word Ego (spelled with a capital) and of referring to the Ego pronominally in the masculine gender. Husserl usually refers to the Ego in the third person singular, a mode of expression I shall use here exclusively. I shall not use the adjectives "pure," "transcendental," "empirical," etc. because they have occasioned much misunderstanding and because what Husserl basically means by Ego can be grasped without them.