I through thou, and we through I: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla on the personal foundation of community
This article is an attempt to scrutinize the phenomenological social ontology of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla by drawing on the particular role and nature of interpersonal relatedness and second-person engagement in the constitution of first-person-plural perspective. Both Hildebrand and Wojtyla endorse the unique value of the person and personality as the foundational principle for different dimensions of community, including the face-to-face “I-thou” way of being together and more complex, even anonymous, we communities. Both philosophers deny the constitutive primacy of first-person plural over first-person singular, the only exception being the mystical body of Christ when “I” is conditioned and formed by “we.” Moreover, what they have in common is the critical reappraisal of one stream in the phenomenological movement, first and foremost associated with Max Scheler's conception of the possibility of a “collective person.” Drawing on Hildebrand's and Wojtyla's accounts, the article endorses the view regarding the relational character of “I,” “thou,” and “we,” claiming that “we” hinges on an experiential dimension of “I.”
(2023) Metaphilosophy 54 (4).
Matiashvili Lasha (2023) „I through thou, and we through I: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla on the personal foundation of community“. Metaphilosophy 54 (4), 493–506.