In this article, I consider how young Martin Heidegger (in his first Freiburg period, 1919-1923) approaches the history of philosophy. I unfold the topic by focusing on the phenomenological-critical destruction, the methodological moment assigned by Heidegger for the task of approaching the history of philosophy, and how he applies this method to history in the lecture course Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. The main aims of the article are, first, to clarify Heidegger’s stance on philosophies need for the engagement with its history by means of the examination of his manner of approaching the history of philosophy, and second, to point to the boundedness between this necessity and the self-determination of philosophy. For this purpose, I show how young Heidegger places, as a result of the destruction, factical life experience to the center of philosophy and justifies, on the basis of the factical life experience, the need for the destruction of philosophy. For young Heidegger, factical life experience is fundamental. This article consists of three parts. First, I offer an introductory clarification of the problem. Next, I specify what I mean by the determination “young Heidegger” and where lies the distinctiveness of his philosophy. Finally, I examine young Heidegger's phenomenological-critical destruction, the manner of how he applies this method to history, and the determination of philosophy, which emerges from the previous analysis.