Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

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235884

Mechanisms revisited

James Woodward

pp. 409-427

Abstract

This paper defends an interventionist treatment of mechanisms and contrasts this with Waskan (forthcoming). Interventionism embodies a difference-making conception of causation. I contrast such conceptions with geometrical/mechanical or “actualist” conceptions, associating Waskan’s proposals with the latter. It is argued that geometrical/mechanical conceptions of causation cannot replace difference-making conceptions in characterizing the behavior of mechanisms, but that some of the intuitions behind the geometrical/mechanical approach can be captured by thinking in terms of spatio-temporally organized difference-making information.

Publication details

Published in:

Piccinini Gualtiero (2011) Neuroscience and its philosophy. Synthese 183 (3).

Pages: 409-427

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9870-3

Full citation:

Woodward James (2011) „Mechanisms revisited“. Synthese 183 (3), 409–427.