In this paper, I attempt to elucidate the phenomenological approach to the problem of primal beginning (Uranfang) in the late Husserl with reference to his analysis of the ego of instincts. The first part deals with the instinct referring to the work of Nam-In Lee. It makes clear that the concept of instinct in Husserl is not the object of psychological analysis, but the authentic phenomenological concept. The second part starts with trying to interpret thoroughly the text no. 43 in Husserl’s Lebenswelt (Husserliana Vol. XXXIX). Thereby, the antero-posterior relationship of the ego and the streaming, or “I think” and “I am” respectively, is explained. The third part explains what the primal beginning of transcendental subjectivity is. Drawing on the method of construction, Husserl discovers the primal beginning of transcendental subjectivity as the intertwining of instinct and affection.