Is it possible, after a century of scientific breakthroughs in Psychology, Anthropology, Ethno- Anthropology as well as after the radical critique to the idea of Subjectivity in Philosophy, to still look for a theory of subjectivity? The paper will put in question the idea of a unique “Self ” starting from the phenomenological approach (by Husserl) to the Life-world and claim the pluralizing of Forms of Life (Life-Forms) as by Wittgenstein. The claim of a plural multiple Self from the point of view of Phenomenology will lead to describe the invariant Dynamics of every Self-reference. Such Dynamics will bring together two elementary features of a phenomenological theory of subjectivity and experience: the structure of horizon and the Life-world. Once described the non-metaphysical and context-related structure underlying the formation of Self-references, the paper will further sketch the task of a general non-metaphysical Mathesis of Subjectivity as convergence between Phenomenology and issues of cognitive sciences on one side and as critique of every metaphysical Egology on the other side.