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Realism and inference to the best explanation
pp. 79-115
Abstract
The overall aim of this book is to develop an account of the nature of the reasons for scientific realism. So far, our aims have been negative or defensive: they have been to show that the (sceptical) arguments against the rationality of realism are (mostly) flawed. In this chapter we begin task of exploring the arguments that have been advanced for realism.
Publication details
Published in:
Wright John (2018) An epistemic foundation for scientific realism: defending realism without inference to the best explanation. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 79-115
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1_4
Full citation:
Wright John (2018) Realism and inference to the best explanation, In: An epistemic foundation for scientific realism, Dordrecht, Springer, 79–115.