Human beings "make their own history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing" (Marx, 1963, p. 15; for variations, see Simmel, 1950, pp. 12–13; Vico, 1968, pp. 382–3, para. 1108) is an aphorism that appears more cogent in the preface to most works in social theory than it does in the conclusions. There is, of course, a substantial body of theory and research that illustrates various processes and procedures through which social action is produced; but such works generally neglect the implication of historically inherited collective circumstances in the course and outcome of social conduct, and make no mention of the constitution of social collectivities. Theory and research that capture the contours of collectivities have been a fundamental objective of social science since its inception; but accounts of social action incorporated in such works typically are designed to stress the intrusion of structure or systemic circumstances into the consciousness of actors or the domain in which activity occurs, while the practices through which the production of social life takes place remain unaddressed. The numerous analytical arguments and methodological procedures that have been advanced to ascribe priority to either social action or the properties of collectivities are difficult to sustain when considered in light of two textbook truisms: the existence of collectivities exhibiting specific properties and particular configurations depends upon the transaction of determinate forms of conduct; conversely, social conduct is carried out in different ways in historically specific types of collectivities.