Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

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209534

Hume on justice

Rosalind Hursthouse

pp. 264-276

Abstract

As everyone knows, Hume begins his discussion of justice in the Treatise by claiming "that no action can be virtuous or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality" (T, 3.2.1.7/479). He recognises that this makes for a "great difficulty" because, in the case of just actions, it seems that my motive for them is my regard for justice, which is not distinct from my sense of their morality, their justice.

Publication details

Published in:

Pigden Charles R. (2009) Hume on motivation and virtue. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Pages: 264-276

DOI: 10.1057/9780230281158_15

Full citation:

Hursthouse Rosalind (2009) „Hume on justice“, In: C. R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on motivation and virtue, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 264–276.