Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

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209522

Is Hume inconsistent?

motivation and morals

Norva Y. S. Lo

pp. 57-79

Abstract

Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; that the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that morality, like truth, is discern’d merely by ideas, and by their j uxta-position and comparison. In order, therefore, to judge of these systems, we need only consider, whether it be possible, from reason alone, to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there must concur some other principles to enable us to make that distinction […]

Publication details

Published in:

Pigden Charles R. (2009) Hume on motivation and virtue. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Pages: 57-79

DOI: 10.1057/9780230281158_3

Full citation:

Lo Norva Y. S. (2009) „Is Hume inconsistent?: motivation and morals“, In: C. R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on motivation and virtue, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 57–79.