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The Nietzschean meta-critique of knowledge
pp. 153-163
Abstract
Nietzsche is famous among philosophers for statements like "There is no truth." Such declarations are thought to characterize his thinking, even if it is undecided whether this ought to be held against him or, indeed, what, if anything at all, claims of this kind might really mean? It is more than an idle convention that statements like this must be self-contradictory or banal, depending respectively on the way they are interpreted. Consequently debates are typically addressed to the logical status of the claim that truth is a "kind of error;" while at the same time it is always assumed that Nietzsche's philosophical importance has necessarily to stand or fall with the significance of such statements.
Publication details
Published in:
Babich Babette (1999) Nietzsche, theories of knowledge, and critical theory I: Nietzsche and the sciences. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 153-163
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2430-2_11
Full citation:
Schmid Holger (1999) „The Nietzschean meta-critique of knowledge“, In: B. Babich (ed.), Nietzsche, theories of knowledge, and critical theory I, Dordrecht, Springer, 153–163.