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Bottom-up approaches to cognition
a defence of cognitive neuroscience
pp. 285-296
Abstract
In his book on vision published in 1982, David Marr claimed that bottom-up or neurophysiological approaches to cognition had failed to live up to expectation, and were unable, in effect and in principle, to explain cognition. He advocated a top-down approach where formalization of cognitive operations was to serve as a starting point, followed by implementation of cognitive models, followed only in the last instance by neurophysiological investigation. Other commentators have followed suit. This presentation is an attempt to refute this position by showing that the relationship between neuroscience and cognitive science is in effect, and in principle, a two way street. The validity of bottom-up illumination of cognitive theorizing is demonstrated with numerous examples.
Publication details
Published in:
Hyland Michael E., Baker William J, van Hezewijk René, Terwee Sybe J S (1990) Recent trends in theoretical psychology: proceedings of the third biennial conference of the international society for theoretical psychology april 17–21, 1989. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 285-296
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4613-9688-8_28
Full citation:
Braun Claude M. J. (1990) „Bottom-up approaches to cognition: a defence of cognitive neuroscience“, In: M. E. Hyland, W.J. Baker, R. Van Hezewijk & S.J.S. Terwee (eds.), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, 285–296.