Psychology-in the propaedeutic literature as well as in its more technical and theoretical tracts - has implicitly and, oftimes, explicitly embraced the empiricist and positivist perspectives. At the same time it has laid claim to scientific realism and, in consequence, developed a profound commitment - in the service of hypotheticalism - to operationism. Notwithstanding psychology's more recent movement away from logical positivism to a more liberalized logical empiricism it has nonetheless been recognized more recently that such a philosophy of science has become largely enervated. Even scientific realism has come under considerable criticism (Laudan, 1981). However, it has been argued that transcendental realism (Bhaskar, 1978) has yielded a virtual Copernican resolution in philosophy of science by providing a non-Kantian alternative to empiricism and rationalism both. This course of events has, for the most part, escaped psychology's notice. In addition, it has remained impervious to paradigms other than its own, in particular, constructionism, hermeneutic and critical theory, to name the most obvious. This neglect coupled with the ambiguous understanding of itself outlined above has led psychology to the embracement of an arthritized methodology which disqualifies other competing epistemologies out of hand and, in consequence, has generated very little coherent theory. More generally, its failure to disambiguate its fundamental postulates coupled with its methodological exclusivity has rendered it somewhat blind to its past and fairly aimless as to its future.