The previous chapter explored historicism by and large through an examination of Alasdair MacIntyre's moral and political theory. According to the historicist, the Enlightenment is a failed project for the reason that, pace Hume and others, all rational enquiry must in fact be constituted and bound by traditions. Enlightenment scepticism is unattainable as an ideal because genuine rationality must be tradition-constituted, and it also follows that Enlightenment scepticism is destructive and dysfunctional in practice because it undervalues and undermines traditions. We also saw that, in MacIntyre's politics, a moral consensus is necessary, and this is a consensus on the hierarchical ordering of all goods, and in this way MacIntyre has tried to re-articulate "the function of man" argument from within historicism. In political engagement, then, we need to agree about what is good and therefore also about what is better and worse and on that basis who is more and less deserving. Moreover, we learn to make such moral judgements by taking the insight of the wise person as our standard of what is good, before then developing the ability to reason for ourselves. Therefore, any commitment to moral equality in historicism is tempered by the acknowledgement of distinctions in worth. This is most significant when it comes to political debate and political engagement. In giving reasons to others, according to the historicist, we should acknowledge that some contributions to society are better than others and deserve greater praise and higher rewards. In debating moral issues, we should also acknowledge the superior insight of others, namely the wise and morally good person.