In its radical formulation, constructivism did not have a place for emotion and motivation. Subsequent revisions initially included these as variables external to cognition that somehow were supposed to modify cognition (despite Hegel's advice that factors and aspects do not change a phenomenon because these are external to it). In more recent formulations, emotions are included not only as moderating variables of cognitive outcomes but also as variables of equal status which usually also have to undergo conceptual changes. It is evident that in this formulation, we are not a bit closer to the kind of relationship between affect and cognition that Lev Vygotsky formulated nearly 80 years ago. The first problem is that emotions are intellectualized and the second it remains external to cognition. In this chapter, I draw on a data set that I have collected in an inner-city classroom to show how in concrete situations, the difference between emotion and cognition becomes undecidable. An integration of emotion and thought becomes possible when we consider both cognition and emotion as one-sided perspectives on the living body in its interactions with the world.