Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

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189498

Complementarity and our knowledge of nature

Henry J. Folse

pp. 51-66

Abstract

Bohr's framework of complementarity should be understood as a realist interpretation of quantum physics, but in order to defend such a reading of Bohr, the epistemic goal of representationalism as applied to atomic objects must be abandoned. This implies that complementarity rejects the meta-epistemic presuppositions of the Cartesian spectator epistemology, but if this epistemological lesson is accepted, then it remains possible to have knowledge about the atomic objects which in interacting with observing systems produce the atomic phenomena that confirm the quantum theoretical account of the atomic domain.

Publication details

Published in:

Carvallo Marc E. (1992) Nature, cognition and system II: current systems-scientific research on natural and cognitive systems volume 2: on complementarity and beyond. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 51-66

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2779-0_4

Full citation:

Folse Henry J. (1992) „Complementarity and our knowledge of nature“, In: M. E. Carvallo (ed.), Nature, cognition and system II, Dordrecht, Springer, 51–66.