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Environmental protection agency enforcement patterns
a case of political pork barrel?
pp. 233-239
Abstract
This study examined the possible link between congressional membership on one of two powerful committees with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversight power and the incidence of EPA citations being levied against those firms headquartered within the committee members' home districts. Using a sample of 109 Fortune 500 firms for the 1992–1993 time period, the results suggest a significant and negative link between committee membership on either the House Appropriations Committee or the House Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Committee, and the number of EPA citations levied against firms headquartered in the districts of the congresspersons serving on these committees. The results suggest that politicians may exercise power in order to protect their constituents, rather than to protect the national interest.
Publication details
Published in:
(2008) Political economy, linguistics and culture: crossing bridges. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 233-239
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-73372-2_9
Full citation:
Couch Jim F., Williams Robert H, Williams Robert R., Williams Robert C (2008) „Environmental protection agency enforcement patterns: a case of political pork barrel?“, In: , Political economy, linguistics and culture, Dordrecht, Springer, 233–239.