Central and East European
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184486

Environmental protection agency enforcement patterns

a case of political pork barrel?

Jim F. Couch Robert H WilliamsRobert R. Williams Robert C Williams

pp. 233-239

Abstract

This study examined the possible link between congressional membership on one of two powerful committees with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversight power and the incidence of EPA citations being levied against those firms headquartered within the committee members' home districts. Using a sample of 109 Fortune 500 firms for the 1992–1993 time period, the results suggest a significant and negative link between committee membership on either the House Appropriations Committee or the House Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Committee, and the number of EPA citations levied against firms headquartered in the districts of the congresspersons serving on these committees. The results suggest that politicians may exercise power in order to protect their constituents, rather than to protect the national interest.

Publication details

Published in:

(2008) Political economy, linguistics and culture: crossing bridges. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 233-239

DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-73372-2_9

Full citation:

Couch Jim F., Williams Robert H, Williams Robert R., Williams Robert C (2008) „Environmental protection agency enforcement patterns: a case of political pork barrel?“, In: , Political economy, linguistics and culture, Dordrecht, Springer, 233–239.