In a short but important article,¹ the Polish philosopher Izydora Dąmbska criticised the thesis — endorsed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński² — that there are "empty' terms which denote no objects at all, besides the usual general and singular terms. Dąmbska remarked that "we usually find cited as examples of empty names such self-contradictory names as' square circle' or' son of a childless mother', or names of mythical deities — fictitious figures that exist only in legends, poems, novels, etc."³ She also pointed out, however, that the basic semantic function of names consists in denoting. This means that, if we admit the concept of a name which denotes nothing, either we arbitrarily change the meaning of the term "name' or run into contradiction. In fact, she observed, "for the everyday interpretation of the term "name', a name which does not denote anything is practically a non-name".⁴