When I was invited to participate in the tribute book to our dear friend Lester Embree, I immediately thought of submitting an essay on a subject highly valued by him. I will later provide more than one explanation concerning the relationship between this phenomenologist and the issue of non-human animals. But, prior to that, it seems to me an obligation to begin by acknowledging reaction which is very frequent whenever one sees a phenomenological analysis as the one I here propose. The reaction among phenomenologists is frequently of bafflement, followed by questions more or less such as these: Why speak about non-human animals from phenomenology? Can phenomenology really contribute to the debate about this matter? The debate on non-human animals – which mainly develops within the field of ethics – is already several years of age and has thus achieved to gather a good amount of specialized literature from the most diverse positions. Well, if phenomenology could contribute to this debate, which would be its contribution? And, in this case, if we place ourselves within phenomenology, and, more precisely, within the thought of Edmund Husserl, is it really justified to address this subject? That is to say, is there any element in Husserlian theory, or its concrete procedure, that can support us here and that can justify an attempt to make a phenomenological contribution to this debate? In other terms, does the analysis of a subject such as that of non-human animals form part of the phenomenological tradition? And, how can this be justified?