Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology

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143261

A physicalist reinterpretion of "phenomenal' spaces

Lieven Decock

pp. 197-225

Abstract

This paper argues that phenomenal or internal metrical spaces are redundant posits. It is shown that we need not posit an internal space-time frame, as the physical space-time suffices to explain geometrical perception, memory and planning. More than the internal space-time frame, the idea of a phenomenal colour space has lent credibility to the idea of internal spaces. It is argued that there is no phenomenal colour space that underlies the various psychophysical colour spaces; it is parasitic upon physical and psychophysical colour spaces. The argumentation is further extended to other sensory spaces and generalised quality spaces.

Publication details

Published in:

(2006) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (2).

Pages: 197-225

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-005-9006-7

Full citation:

Decock Lieven (2006) „A physicalist reinterpretion of "phenomenal' spaces“. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (2), 197–225.