In my contribution, I want to examine the meontic thinking of the world in the early philosophy of Eugen Fink in relation to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of multiplicity. Fink’s idea of meontic is particularly interesting because, on the one hand, it deals with traditional themes of phenomenology and, on the other, it does it in such a way that phenomenology as a project becomes fundamentally questionable. According to Fink, world is something that resists the criteria of appearance and only appears as non-appearance. Here, the primacy of a foundation of sciences through a phenomenological epoché falls short and requires a change in perspective. We need an access to so called limit-phenomena (Grenzphänomene); the world, death, past and corporeality reflect the meontic relationship to the world and must be thought differently. At this point, Deleuze’s reflections are particularly interesting. Deleuze, who has not yet been sufficiently examined in research in his relation with Fink, shares his meontic approach explicitly. However, even more radically than Fink, Deleuze develops a thinking of meontic multiplicity of worlds, all of which demand unique philosophical approaches. In the full sense of the conference “The Many Worlds of Phenomenology”, Deleuze can offer a perspective according to which the multitude of world concepts in phenomenology has an inherent reason. It therefore opens up the path to ever new drafts of worldliness and how they border on others in the sense of a philosophical community.