After the publication of Husserl’s Ideas I, Edith Stein describes in a letter to Roman Ingarden her relationship to Husserl’s transcendental idealism as the one that “must be understood differently” and “in Husserl’s sense”. Eugen Fink also reports in his essay “Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik” (1933), about the misinterpretation of the transcendental phenomenology Husserl based on the Ideas. In my paper, I attempt to confront the different interpretations of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, at the two generations of Husserl’s students, by the interpretation and extensive thematisation of the Husserlian methodology. Although in different ways, the question of the methodology of Husserl’s phenomenology was formulated by the two generations of the early Munich-Göttinger students and by Eugen Fink through the problematisation of the experience of the world, the constitution, and the role of memory. The difference is remarkable in the different approach to the methodology: Whereas the world experience, the external world, the constitution and reduction appeared for the early phenomenologists as fields of the intentionality, the phenomenological method is in itself and inseparably realised in the world experience and constitutional process for Eugen Fink. The question for Fink is, of what happens during the constitutional process, and how the world experience and the external world are inseparably connected with the constitutional act of the consciousness. Based on my hypothesis, the difference of the interpretations is founded on Husserl’s step-by-step methodological phenomenology. The present contribution will look behind the meanings and methodological consequences of the world experience in the different generations of Husserl’s circle, and outline Husserl’s methodological development between the publication of the Ideas and the appearance of the Formal and transcendental Logic and the Cartesian Meditations.