In the article I aim to answer the question whether and how can we err in aesthetic judgments. Starting with Hume’s thesis that sentiment is always right as a typical example of thesis of infallibility of aesthetic judgments, I ultimately seek to disprove such thesis and show that it is possible to err in aesthetic judgments on normative grounds. I begin with consideration of Husserl’s redefinition of the notion of transcendence and with his interpretation of the phenomenon of error. I then proceed to analyze two approaches to the question: Ingarden’s consideration of aesthetic values as objectively grounded, and Dufrenne’s consideration of aesthetic values as intersubjectively grounded, but because of that actually being capable of being subject to disclosure and analysis. After assessing these approaches I conclude that there are sufficient grounds for the thesis that aesthetic judgments are, in principle, intersubjectively correctible, and that such correction takes, or can take place, in art critical discourse.