Jacques Derrida was one of the major proponents of the idea in the 20th century to rewrite the history of philosophy. In the tradition of both Husserl and Heidegger, Derrida’s engagement with the tradition was inspired by phenomenological methods. In the pursuit of a criticism of the metaphysics of presence, Derrida then developed his own technique of immanent reading. One of the key insights here is that philosophical texts can be read in ways so different that they contradict, subvert, and thereby deconstruct each other. However, these various ways can nonetheless be possible within the same textual framework and without applying external criteria to it.
In my contribution, I want to ask to what extent this insight affects our understanding of the history of philosophy. Thereby, I want to address two consecutive questions and outline tentative answers. Firstly, by broadening Derrida’s perspective, I want to ask whether the history of philosophy developed according to specific “reading attitudes” that work as underlying suppositions (analogous e.g., to what Husserl calls natural attitude). These attitudes would not be of mere interpretative interest but would be constitutive for the respective philosophies. Quoting Plotinus, Hegel, and Derrida himself as examples, I will briefly illuminate how philosophers always build their own positions through a philosophical reading of others. My second question from here is whether Derrida’s approach can give rise to a general phenomenological approach of revealing different reading attitudes. This approach would require analyses of the frameworks which are implicitly operative in philosophy. I will end with the hypothesis that only with the means of a phenomenology concerning the attitudes of engaging with the history of philosophy can we adequately bear witness to the foundations of our own understanding of philosophy nowadays and whether it is appropriate.