For phenomenology, the history of philosophy cannot be some assumed complex of knowledge, which is necessary for us to be able to start with phenomenological philosophizing. In this sense, Husserl resolutely rejects the possibility of any “introduction” to phenomenology guided by the history of philosophy. All our prior knowledge about the history of philosophy for phenomenology can only have the status of a mere opinion that, through concrete research, has yet to break through to its full clarity and discover its true meaning. In order to establish genuine contact and the possibility of communication between the history of philosophy and phenomenology, it is necessary that the history of philosophy itself is also drawn into the process of reflection (Besinnung). Conceptualizing the history of philosophy should reveal whether there is any possibility of true realization, or the implementation of what can be established as the telos “intended” in it, while this implementation does not in any case result in historical-philosophical knowledge. At the same time, it does not initiate the constitution, that is, the development of phenomenological knowledge itself. Revealing the meaning of the immanent history of philosophy and the self-development of phenomenology in this sense should not be understood as two different tasks but as the realization of a unique process of reflection. That is why the history of philosophy cannot be properly approached if it is done only in a historical way, but it is necessary to articulate the historical process through a unique genesis that is both historical and ideal. The peculiarity of Husserl's concept of the history of philosophy consists in emphasizing the personal responsibility of the philosopher. We are not talking about any big shifts when it comes to specific, historical-philosophical knowledge. The idea that European culture is built on fundamentally different foundations than those valid for the modern world of technology seems much more significant.