Conference | Paper

Husserl’s philosopher leaves the cave by, paradoxically, remaining in it, but no longer shares the beliefs of his silent, inactive neighbors. Unlike their attachment, the phenomenological inhabitant of the cave will reflect the degree of the justification of his beliefs, but at the same time he will come out of his individuality, varying his individual ego in accordance with various variations of himself that open with the temptation of otherness. In order to get rid of the cave limitations, it is not necessary to leave the cave ambience. It is enough to change our attitude. Husserl’s idea of sociality examines the intersubjective constitution of the subject, including theories of strangeness and otherness. If we come to our senses, let us be convinced that the experience of a foreigner has already done its job. The rationality of phenomenological politics becomes detectable by recognizing others in oneself. Its peaceful assumption rests in recognizing others, even strangers, as variations of myself. The capacity to acquire enemies is largely neutralized by such an approach.